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I 9 Introduction
Traditional macroeconomic models have been constructed on
the presumption of private market failure. Labor markets, capital
markets, or goods markets are seen to be incapable of allocating
resources in a Pareto efficient manner, at least without signifi-
cant time lags. The primary role for fiscal policy in such an
environment is to stimulate aggregate demand in response to an
adverse supply or, more frequently, demand shock to the economy.
The persistent belief in widespread market inefficiency then leads
quite naturally to the conclusion that such policy actions will be
capable of altering real economic, outcomes in a welfare enhancing
manner.
Recently, certain macroeconomists have begun to question
the validity of the basic premise of pervasive market failure.
Approaching fiscal policy questions from the opposite perspective
of market efficiency, these economists have reconsidered the
positive and normative spects of government tax and spending
changes. On the side of positive analysis, they have been con-
cerned with the effects of fiscal policy actions on real variables
such as employment, output, investment (Bailey (1971), Grossman
and Lucas (1974), Hall (1980) , Barro (1981 , 1984), Aschauer (1982)
and Bryant (1983)], and the current account [Greenwood (1983),
Sachs (1-^. Si and Kimibrough (1985)]. On the normative side, they
have bee iterested in determining whether fiscal stabilization
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policy is welfare improving (Kydland and Prescott (1980a)) and in
specifying the optimal tax structure [Barro (1979), Kydland and
Prescott (1980b), Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Razin and Svensson
(1983)].
This paper is intended to bring together and elaborate upon
such issues in the common framework of a small choice-theoretic
intertemporal general equilibrium model. While the model employed
is simple, it still allows for government services to yield con-
sumption benefits for individuals and production benefits for
firms. It also permits government investment in public capital
which has the potential of enlarging society's future production
possibilities and of augmenting the rate of return on private
capital. The incorporation of distortional taxes on the returns
to labor service and investment makes possible a discussion of
the positive and normative effects of tax changes. Finplly, a
slight extension of the model allows for a consideration of open
economy issues arising from domestic fiscal policy actions.
An important characteristic of the modeling strategy adopted
here is that economic agents make their consumption, investment,
labor effort, and production decisions in a rational manner based
upon forward-looking behavior about both government spending and
taxation policies. One benefit of this approach is that it high-
lights the importance of distinguishing clearly between anticipated
versus unanticipated as well as temporary versus permanent fiscal
policy actions in tracing out the effects such policy is likely to
have on the economy.
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In Sections II and III the maximization problem of the
representative agent and the economy's general equilibrium are
presented. A positive analysis of the effects of changes in
tax rates is pursued in Section IV. The question of the desirability
of tax~ policy to stabilize macroeconomic variables then is con-
sidered in Section V. The discussion in Section VI focuses on the
positive effects of public expenditure, after which the question
of optimal fiscal policy is taken up in Section VII. In
Section VIII some 'simulation results are presented to bring together
the issues raised earlier in terms of government spending and
taxation. Finally, some of the effects of fiscal policy in an
open economy setting are outlined in Section IX and conclud.ng
comments offered in Section X.
II. The Representative Agent's Maximization Problem
Consider the following model of a "closed" economy. The
world is inhabited by arepresentative agent who lives for two
periods. The agent's goal is to maximize the value of the
following lifetime utility function U() as given by
U =ti(c) + V() + p[U(c 2 ) +V(2 2 )] pe(0,1) (1)
(with U' >0, and V',V",U" <0)
where @ i. the individual's (constant) subjective discount factor,
cand c''.present his "effective" consumption in the first and
second per. ods, and Agand 22 denote his labor supply in these
periods. Effective consumption in a period, say t, is taken to be
4
a function of private consumption expenditure, ct, and government
expenditure on consumption goods, gt. Specifically, it is assumed
that ct =c t + a(g ) where a(*) is an increasing concave function.
As can be seen, government purchases are allowed to influence
utility directly by providing a current substitute for private con-
sumption goods with no interaction with leisure. The marginal rate
of substitution between private and public consumption goods, cx',
is assumed to lie between 0 and l so that an incremental unit of
publicly provided goods yields only a fraction of the utility to
be derived from an extra unit of privately purchased goods. This
assumption is crucial for this modeling strategy since it implies
that increases in government spending will impose negative wealth
effects on the representative agent. The recent empirical work
of Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) report values for a'(*) in the
range of .20 to .40, however, so that it does not appear that this
assumption is unrealistic.
The individual derives his income in each period through
the owner-operation of a firm. The firm produces one good by use
of two factors of production, labor, 2, and capital, i. Also, in
each period the government provides services, g , which aid private
production in that period, and undertakes public investment, g1,
which will augment future private production. In particular,
period-t output, yt, of the firm is characterized by the following
production function:
7t 6+ f(2t,g ) + h(it' t) + it + gt=1,2 (2)
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where St represents a time-varying constant.
It is assumed that the marginal product of current public
services, f 2 (*), is less than unity. This is analogous to the
negative wealth effect discussed above'for the public consumption
goods case although here no hard empirical evidence is available
to lay a foundation for the claim of public sector "inefficiency".
It also will-be assumed that public investment is inefficient in
the sense that the marginal product of public capital, h2 (.),
'is less than that of private capital, h1 (). Note that the
production technology is specified such that there is no direct
interplay between g and the marginal productivity of private
capital or between g and the marginal product of labor. This may
seem restrictive but it still allows for analysis of how changes
in the level of government spending may affect the marginal product
of labor, and consequently the demand for labor, as well as how
such changes might impact on the rate of return to private capital,
and therefore private investment demand.
In addition to earning income each period through the owner-
operation of a firm, it will be assumed that the individual receives
- - = a transfer payment, r, from the government. The agent can use the
after-tax income from his firm and this transfer payment in three
ways--taxes will be discussed momentarily. These earnings can be
used to i tance consumption, purchase capital goods for use next
period, o buy real denominated bonds. The real denominated
bonds have a return of r so that a bond purchased in the first
period for one unit of consumption pays 1 + r units of consumption
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in the second period.
Recall that in each period the government engages in four
types of spending. It provides consumption and production services,
public investment goods, and transfer payments. This spending can
be financed by bond issuance or by use of the following tax instruments.
In each period t the government levies a proportional tax in the amount
t on that portion of output that is attributable to labor effort.
t
Essentially, Xt is the labor-income tax rate in period t. Also, the
value added from the firm's production derived from capital investment
is taxed at the rate 8t.. One can view t as being the period-t corporate
income tax rate.
The maximization problem facing the representative agent is
shown below with the agent's choice variables being c1 , c2 ' ' 2
and i.123
W(-)-max{U(c +a(g )) +V( )+P(U(c 2 +za(g )) +V(.2)]j (3)
subject to
c + 1+r) 61 + (1-X) f(2,gf+ (1+(1e)h(igi)Tri +f)r+ (1+r)
[Note that for simplicity it has been assumed that 62= 0.]
The first-order conditions associated with this maximization problem--
in addition to the above budget constraint--are shown below. They
are:
U '(ci +ca(g{)) = (1+r)U '(c 2 +cMg2) 4
-v (2.) = (1- )f 1 (,g$)U'(c 1 +a(g )) (5)
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-iV'(2 ) = (V-)f 1 (C 2 ,g )U,(c 2 +a(gc)) (6)
(1-e)h 1 (i,g ) = r. (7)
These conditions have the usual interpretation, (4) being an inter-
temporal efficiency condition in effective consumption, (5) and (6)
being intratemporal efficiency conditions in effective consumption
and work effort, and (7) an intertemporal efficiency condition in
production undertaken through the use of physical capital. Note
that r is equal to the after-tax real rate of return on capital
investment.
III. The Model's General Equilibrium
In the model the goods market must clear each period,
implying that the two market-clearing conditions shown below must
hold:
c 2 i
C 1 + i+ g 1 + g1 +g = 61 + f( A,g) (8)
c2+ 9g + g£= f(2,g) + h(igA) + i + g . (9)2 g 2 = 22
By utilizing the above two conditions in conjunction with the first-
order conditions (4) to (7)., it can be seen that solutions for £
22' and i in the model's general equilibrium are implicitly
characterized by the three equations (10), (11) and (12):4
-V')-~6~ +fg 1 - i- g"+a(g1 ) -g - g )(1-X 1 )f 1 ,g1) (10)
8
-V'(22 ) -U '(f( 2 2,g) +h(i,g)+i+g - g +a(g2) - g 2 )~)(-)f (2,g 2 (1
z z2 ~ i 2
+h(i,g)+i+g' - g+a(g) -g). (1
This system of equations can be subjected to various comparative
static exercises to determine how changes in tax parameters, X,
and 9 , or government spending variables, g1, g2  '1 , g2 and g
affect the economy's general equilibrium. These questions will be
addressed in subsequent sections of the paper.
Finally, before proceeding further it should be noted that
the government, like any other'actor in the economy, must satisfy
a budget constraint. Its budget constraint is
g2_+_ T2f( 2 ,g+h(i,g )
1+(T + '( + ',g1 (1+r) (13)1 10+r)1(1++
c 2 i- c t i
where g1  g1 + g1 + g and g2  g2 + g2 - g represent the govern-
ment's absorption of resources in periods one and two, respectively.
IV, Changes in Income Tax Rates
In traditional macroeconomic models, tax changes have been
imagined to be important principally for their ability to affect
the current flow of disposable income and hence the aggregate
demand for goods and services, In contrast, the model developed
in this paper implicitly adopts conditions sufficient to produce
a "Ricardian" equivalence between lump-sum tax and debt financing
of a particular stream of government spending.5 Consequently, the
focus shifts to an analysis of the role changes in tax rates might
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play in the determination of employment, output, consumption, and
investment by altering the incentives to engage in market activity
(consumption, employment, and production) in one or the other
period (temporary tax changes) or. in both periods (permanent tax
changes). In the subsequent analysis, changes in labor-income tax
rates as well as corporate-income tax rates are considered.
a) Changes in Labor-Income Tax Rates
Imagine that the government announces that it intends to
increase the future level of income taxes, i.e., d =0, dX2>0.
The increase in revenue arising from this anticipated tax hike
will be used to finance lump-sum transfer payments to the
representative agent. Since the timing of these transfer payments
is inconsequential just their present value, r, will be focused
on here, where T = T + (1/(l+r))r 2 . By subjecting (10),, (11), and
(12) to the required comparative statics exercise, it can be seen
that (see Appendix A for details)
dI1 d0 2 di
--- > 0,)--- C0,and --- > 0.X(14)
With the help of the above solutions, the effect of an increase in
future taxes on first-period consumption can be determined
r eadily f r - (8) . One obt ain s (ag ain , see Appendix A f or
details)
1d2. di
- f 1 ) --- --- < 0(15)
d l d d2
10
The above results can be interpreted intuitively. First, as can be
seen, an increase in future income taxation raises current and
reduces future work effort. This reflects an intertemporal sub-
stitution effect as agents substitute away from working in the
future, where the after-tax rate of return is now smaller, toward
working in the present, where the rate of return is now relatively
higher. Second, note that current investment is increased as a
result of the rise in future income taxes. This follows because
future output can be obtained either by working in the future or
through investing in capital during the current period. In general,
agents would like to obtain a relatively smooth profile of con-
sumption over time, so by investing more in the current period they
can p'rtially compensate for the loss in future output due to the
reduction in future labor effort. Third, as can be seen from (15),
the increase in future taxes leads to a reduction in current con-
sumption. This arises because the increase in first-period invest-
ment, while being partly financed by an increase in current labor
supply, also is financed partly by a reduction in current consumption.
The effects of an anticipated labor-income tax rate increase
on current real activity outlined above depend crucially on the
inclusion of physical investment in the model. Given the time-
separable specification of preferences, without physical investment,
there would be no link between real activity in adjacent periods, a
fact Barro and King (1985) have emphasized. Thus, an increase in
future labor taxation would have no effect whatsoever on current
real activity. This is easily confirmed in the current setting by
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noting that without investment (10) alone would implicitly describe
the determination of current labor effort, £ . Furthermore, note
that another implication of the time-separable preference structure
is that anticipated future shocks must affect current consumption
and labor supply in opposite directions as is easily discerned from
(5).
The welfare effect of a change in future labor income taxes
is not difficult to uncover. To determine the impact on welfare
of a.change in the period-t labor income tax rate, differentiate
both sides of equation (3) with respect to At while applying the
standard envelope theorem. One obtains
dW 3 W dT W dr.
dX d }frd
t t t t
t -12
= U'(c ){-(y[ ) f(t)+ - ( )t(-) f (2) + (1-8)ih(* + i + r - c2} t,
t 2 t
This expression can be simplified further by using the government's
budget constraint (13) and the goods market-clearing condition (9)
to find that
dW _ f1(2) d 2  eh,(-)
-- =U( ) {f(1)-- + I -- -< 0(16dX 1 1 d2 (1+r) dX (1+r) d A(
... t U t t t-
In general, the effect on welfare of an increase in the
period-t ]abor-income tax rate is ambiguous since the sign of (16)
is uncer _ . It is not difficult to see why. Take the case under
consider: .n of an increase in the future labor-income tax rate.
Now, suppose that the tax on capital's income is zero, or that
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0 =0, and that initially =0 and >0. Here an increase in
future income taxes unambiguously lowers economic welfare. When
there are no other taxes in place, the anticipation of an increase
in future income taxes reduces welfare. Now contrast this with
the case where initially >0 and X2= 0. Here an increase in
future income taxes raises economic welfare. This may seem
paradoxical until one realizes that this is a second-best situation.
Note that the effect of initially having an income tax solely in
the first period is to create a distortion whereby agents tend
to favor second-period labor effort vis-a-vis first-period labor
effort. This distortion reduces welfare, ceteris paribus. The
institution of a small income tax in the second period improves
economic welfare since it works against this intertemporal sub-
stitution effect caused by the original distortion. That is, it
tends to increase labor effort in the first period and reduce it
in the second which helps to ameliorate the situation.
b) Changes in the Corporate Income Tax
Suppose that the government increases the corporate income
tax rate, 6 Again, the system of equations (10), (11), and (12)
describing the economy's general equilibrium, can be used to find
d dAl. dc
<0 >0, <0adO >,(17)
To begin with, as undoubtedly expected, current investment ,
i, falls as a result of the increase in the corporate income tax
rate. This occurs because the after-tax rate of return, r, on
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investment is now reduced. Since current investment falls, more
first-period output is available for alternative uses. In
particular, the agent uses these extra resources to increase his
current consumption and to reduce his current labor effort, both
of these decisions being partly motivated by the drop in the
(after-tax) real interest rate, r. Finally, note that the future
supply of labor, o2, increases. This is because the reduction in2'
current investment causes future output, y2 , and hence consumption,
c2' to fall. This fall in future output due to a lower capital
stock is partially offset by the agent increasing his labor supply
in that period.
To conclude this section of the paper, Table 1 is presented
which summarizes the model's main conclusions about changes in
tax rates.7 As can be seen, when analyzing the impact of shifts
in the labor-income tax rate, it is important to distinguish whether
the tax rate movement is transitory or permanent in character,
and whether it reflects a current unanticipated event or unexpected
future one.
V. Tax Policy and Business Cycle Stabilization
It has often been suggested that tax instruments should be
used to dampen business cycle fluctuations. In particular,
economists often advocate the use of procyclical tax policies in
responso e an adverse shock to the system. In this section,
through til. - use of a simple example, the "feasibility and
desirability" of such policies is contemplated.
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Table 1
TAX CHANGE (andy 1 ) .22 i c
(i) Anticipated increase in (+) (-) (+) (-)
future income tax rate,
i.e., a=0, ag>0.
(ii) Unanticipated temporary (-) (+) (-) (-)
increase in current income
tax rate, i.e., A >0,
a =0.
(iii) Unanticipated permanent (-) (-) (0)1 (-)
increase in the current
income tax rate, i.e.,
(iv) An increase in the C-) (+) C-) (+)
corporate income tax
rate, 9.
'Some initial conditions have been assumed in deriving this
resul, Firt, tc c I Itresult. First, it has been assumed that g = gl, g% g 2 , and
8 = 0. Second, note from (7) that investment, i, can be written
as a function of the real interest rate, r, and government spending
on public investment, g , so that i = i(r,g) . Now also assume that
61 h(i(L,g),g1) + 2 i( ,g )+2g , These initial conditions
make the first and second periods identical from the agent's
perspective and start the model off from a steady-state situation.
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To begin with, abstract from the revenue-raising motives
for taxation by assuming that there is no government spending on
goods in the artificial economy modeled here. Also, assume that
all taxes and lump-sum transfer payments are initially set at
zero. Now let the second-period production function be subject
to an additive shock, 82, so
y2 2 + f(2 2 ) + h(i) + i
where 2, a mean zero random variable, is governed by the
probability density function p(62*
The economy is supervised by a central planner who desires
to maximize the representative agent's welfare. The planner's
first-period maximization problem is shown below where he is
choosing i, £ , and a state-contingent value for second-period
labor supply2 2 , 2 ). It is assumed that the policymaker
has no informational advantage over the representative agent in
regard to the particular realization for 62. Thus, one has
W = maxU(61 +f(2 1 ) i) +V(2) +Pj[U(6 2 +f( 2 ) +h(i) +i) +V( 2 )p()6 2 . (18
-- The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions arising from '
this problem are
U '(6 + f(PA) - i) = p1+h(i)]JU'( 2 +f( 2 ) +h(i) +i)p( 2)d8 2 (9
(2)=f 1 (2 )U'(8 1+f(4 ) - i) (20)
-Y (22 2 f 1 ( 2 )U '( 2 +f( 2 ) + h(i)+ i) (21)
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where (21) implicitly describes the state-contingent value for 22
as a function of i and 2
A natural question to ask is: how does increased
variability in the random variable 62 affect the representative
agent's expected welfare, W? To answer this question, let 62 be
a linear function of another variable 62 so 62 a-S2, where o- is
a constant and 2 is a zero mean random variable with density
function p(62 ), which implies p( 2 .) = p(62/-)( . Now, to obtain
the effect of such an increase in the dispersion of 62 on the
agent's welfare differentiate (18) with respect to o- while
utilizing the first-order conditions (19), (20), and (21). One
obt ains
W/d- = 0J/U '(c 2) 6 2 p( 2 ) d6 2 = cov(U '(c2) ,6) (22)
The above expression is unambiguously negative as long as
the agent is risk averse since c 2 is an increasing function of
62 (see Appendix A) and the covariance between a variable 
and a
decreasing (increasing) function of itself is negative (positive).
Thus, a mean preserving increase in the dispersion of the random
variable 62 lowers the representative agent's expected welfare, W.
It may not be surprising, therefore, to find pressure being placed
on the fiscal authorities to attempt to reduce the variability of
second -period income .
Suppose that the government accedes to this pressure and
decides to stabilize the fluctuating component of second-period
output. The only component of output which actually varies in
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the second period is 62 +f(I 2 ). Let the government choose to
peg this stochastic component of output at some constant level
so that 52 +f(I 2 ) =y. There are three interesting questions
associated with this policy: (i) Will the stabilization policy
enhance societal welfare? (ii) in what way can output be
stabilized? (iii) What will be the effects of the policy on
macroeconomic variables such as current employment, output and
inve stment?
Given this stabilization policy, the central planner's
problem is now
W maxU(61 + f() - £) +V(A) +pf [U(6 2 +f(2 2 ) +h(f ) +i) +V(Z 2)
+0(> 2 -f( 2 ))Jp( 2 )d 2  (23)
with i, 2 , =2 2 2 ( , 2 ) again being the choice variables. Here,
the ""' is meant to denote that the choice variables are being
determined optimally in the presence of the stabilization constraint.
The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for a constrained
maximum are
Uv (S +f= [1+h (f [U '(22+2(2)+(h(')+i)p(62)dS2(24)
62 +f( f* y- (27)
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Note that the implied solutions for i, 2 , 2 ,62)* and 0 will
be unique given the concavity of the objective function together
with the convexity of the constraint.
The answer to the first of the questions posed above is
immediate. Income stabilization cannot improve the welfare of
this artificial economy since the addition of the stabilization
constraint to problem (18) can only reduce the value of the
maximand by restricting the economy's opportunity set. This con-
clusion would be robust to any other source of aggregate uncertainty,
such as second-period multiplicative shocks to the functions f(')
and h(*).
The answer to the second question is almost as immediate.
Inspection of equation (26) reveals that the government can
stabilize second-period output fluctuations by imposing a state-
contingent labor-income tax, , in the amountX2 = f/U (y+h(i)+I) .
Given the constraint, the tax rate must move in a procyclical
fashion with respect to the productivity shock, with the movement
being governed by
d r (2- 2 8+ 1 -2))}U '(y + h(i +i) (13X -( ( (2- --- -2 >0 (28)
- db52 f (f~w (-62))9'(+ h (i) +
which shows clearly that the movement in the tax rate will depend
intimately on the elasticities of the marginal disutility of labor
and the marginal product of labor or, roughly speaking, the supply
of and d emand f or labor . Con sequent ly , a complet ely suc ce ssful
state contingent policy will require a detailed knowledge of the
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characteristics of preferences and technology.
Finally, how is the stabilization scheme likely to affect
first-period production, labor supply and consumption? To
facilitate answering this question, suppose that the government
decides to stabilize the random component of output at the mean
level it takes in the absence of intervention. Thus
= J[62 +f(2 2 (is 2 ))p(6 2 )dS 2 .
Also, assume that the momentary utility function in consumption
U(-) is characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion which
requires that U"'(-) > 0.
Now, to see how stabilization policy of the sort above will
affect investment, first note that as a consequence of (20) and (25)
first-period labor supply--with or without government intervention--
can be written solely as a single, increasing function of invest-
ment. In other words, it is possible to write = 1(i) and
= (i). Second, by taking a second-order Taylor expansion of
the marginal utility of consumption around y in the right-hand side
of (19) it can be seen that
U ' -(61 + f((i)). - i) [1 +h1 (i) ]Ui/(y + h(i) + i)
+ ( [1+h 1 (i) ]ff[6 2+f( 2( 2 i)- ] 2p(62) d623
* inf U (2 2 2)h()+i
62
1 +[ +h 1 (i)]U '(+ h-(i) + i) (29)
Next, from (24) and (27) it follows that in the presence of
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stabilization policy equation (29) must hold with equality if i
is replaced by i. Since the right-hand side of (29) is decreasing
in i, while the left-hand side is increasing in this variable,
it follows immediately that i < i. Consequently, it then occurs
that < and c > c1 (see Appendix A).
Thus, in the presence of the stabilization policy it is
seen that agents respond to the reduction in uncertainty about
future income by increasing current consumption as well as
decreasing current work effort, output and investment. In this
sense, the oft-stated macroeconomic goals of "economic growth"
and "stability" may be contradictory; the pursuit of the latter
has been shown to reduce the former in this simple example. Further,
although' individuals are better off from the standpoint of their
current period utility calculation (consumption rising and work
effort falling) they experience a loss in their future expected
utility (due to the elimination of the ability to respond to random
shocks reflecting changes in the future opportunity set facing
society) which dominates the former effect and, on net, their ex-
pected welfare declines.
vi, Changes in Government Spending
This section directs attention toward the macroeconomic
impact of public purchases. In the model developed here, govern-
ment spending of various sorts may affect employment, output,
consumption, and investment by altering the wealth of the
representative agent or by directly affecting the marginal
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productivity of labor and private capital. So as to isolate the
effects of government spending, per se, it will be assumed that all
revenue is raised through lump-sum taxation (i.e., let = 2= 0=0)
As has been mentioned, due to the Ricardian equivalence theorem
the timing of lump-sum taxation is irrelevant for the determination
of the real variables in the system. Changes in public expenditure
on services and on public capital are considered in turn.
a) Changesg in Government Spending on Service s
To begin with, consider an unanticipated temporary increase
in government spending on services. To perform this experiment,
define g1 as first-period total government spending on services
so thats = gC+ g 1 . Now let p be the fraction of total government
expenditure on services devoted to the provision of government
consumption services so that (1-p) represents the fraction assigned
to the provision of production services. Consequently, it follows
that a temporary increase in government expenditure on services
c- s s c 
X
implies that dg1 = pdg 1 , dg = (1-p)dg , and dg2 = dg2 "=0.
The impact on the agent's welfare resulting from the
temporary increase in government services can be seen by
differentiating (3) to be
dW -W _W.' - W dT W dr
dg1  dg1  dg1  dg1
(where again, T =r + (1 /(1+r))r 2)
= -U '(c~){1-pa'() -(1-p)f 2 (2 ',gs)3 < 0 (30)
(Using the standard envelope theorem result, and (9) and (13)1.
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As can be seen, when government expenditure is increased
temporarily, the agent suffers a welfare loss since by
assumption both a i(-) and f 2 (.) lie between zero and one.
The effect of a temporary change in gi on 'I £, 2, and i
can be deduced from the system of equations (10), (11), and (12).9
Under the assumption that the private production process is
separable in labor and government services (to be relaxed
momentarily), the following results obtain
d dL
- >0, -2>0, and d <0. (31)
dg1 dg dg.
Consequently, the effects on output in the first and second periods,
respectively, are given by
dy1  1 1 di 1 (2





= f (2) - + (1+r) S < 0. (33)
dg dg1  dg1
(+) (-)
Note that the negative wealth effect associated with the temporary
rise in government purchases induces the agent to decrease con-
sumption and increase labor supply in both periods. Further, 'the
temporal incidence of the rise in government purchases lies in the
current period. That is, the impact effect of the fiscal shock is
to reduce the amount of first-period resources available for
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private consumption in that period. In an attempt to smooth
effective consumption and leisure over time, therefore, the agent
decreases capital accumulation which, in turn, raises the real
rate of return and promotes an intertemporal substitution of work
effort to the present, and of consumption to the future. On net,
output rises in the current period and falls in the future. In the
latter case, the increased output due to increased labor effort is
dominated by the fall in output due to decreased capital accumula-
tion. This insures that consumption in both periods is reduced in
the final equilibrium.
The direct impact which higher government spending may
have on the marginal product of labor is now considered. If govern-
ment services are technical complements with labor, then the positive
effect on current work effort is reinforced as labor is substituted
across periods in response to the rise in the relative wage
(1+r)f 1 (1)/f 2 (2). Ambiguities arise given a sufficiently large
value of the complementarity term f 1 2 (1) since it becomes possible
for the rise in the relative wage to induce a reduction in second-
period work effort and an increase in capital accumulation.
Ambiguities also become evident in the opposite case of technical
substitutability since the decrease in the relative wage in the
first period tends to reduce current work effort, acting against
the r in labor prompted by the negative wealth effect of higher
gove: it expenditure. Note that if pa '() + (1-p)f 2 (l) equals
unity--so that there would be no wealth effect associated with a
marginal increase in government spending--this channel would still
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still allow for real effects of government purchases. For the case
of technical complementarity and zero wealth effects it is possible
to state unambiguously that current work effort would increase at the
expense of future work effort and capital accumulation would rise
to carry forward part of the production of the relatively favorable
first period.
Next consider a rise in government expenditure in the second
period which is foreseen by the agent. Again assuming separability
in production between labor and government services, one finds
d/ d.12 di0, >0, and >0. (34)
dgs dgs dgs
dg2 02 02
Further, the effect on output is (clearly) positive in both
periods. The anticipated government expenditure imposes a negative
wealth effect, as before, and the agent responds by reducing con-
sumption and increasing work effort in both periods. In his attempt
to prepare for the extraordinary call for resources in the second
period, the agent increases saving which, in turn, lowers the rate
of return and causes a secondary shift in work effort from the
present to the future.
Notice that the main qualitative difference in the effects of
unanticipated versus anticipated changes in government expenditure
lies in the behavior of private investment and the capital stock.
In a more general model with multiple periods, anticipated increases
in government spending would tend to lead to increased capital
accumulation prior to the fiscal policy action, an effect which
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would be absent from the case where the fiscal policy change is
unexpected. That is, the ability to accumulate (or decumulate)
capital allows the agent partially to buffer fiscal shocks. Con-
sequently, it would appear that the effect on work effort at the
time of the fiscal change would be smaller in the anticipated case
since the agent has had time to prepare for the expected excess
demand for resources at that time.
Finally, a permanent increase in government spending of an
equal amount in both periods will be considered (i.e., dgs = dgs
= dg). Assuming, once again, separability in production, we get
in the lump-sum tax environment
d5 d2 dg
- > 0 ,--- > 0, and --- i - 0. _ s_ (35)
dg dg dg
Furthermore, output rises and consumption falls in both periods. As
before, the rise in government spending is a drain on wealth and
labor effort and consumption react accordingly, the first rising and
the latter falling in both periods. Note the ambiguity in the
response of investment to the permanent shock in government spending.
In the benchmark case where the real rate of return and time
preference are equal--in a steady-state situation of optimizing models
along the lines of Sidrauski (1967)--'the effect on capital accumulation
is nil. .this situation the agent desires to distribute the burden
of the g -nment spending shock equally across both periods. Con-
crete prections outside of the benchmark case seem hard to obtain.) 0
To the extent that the borderline condition holds, however, there
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arises an important empirical distinction between (unanticipated)
temporary and permanent changes in government expenditures, with
investment falling in the former case and remaining unchanged in
the latter case.
b) Public Investment
As a final exercise, consider a rise in the level of public
investment, dg > 0. Recall that it is assumed that the public
capital is less productive at the margin than private capital
(i.e., h2 (i,g ) <h 1 (i,gi)). By following the line of argument
employed in the previous section, it can be seen that the welfare
loss associated with an increase in public investment is given by
-U (E1)(r - h2 (i ,gi)3]/(1+r) < 0 . (36)
dg
The net effedts on work effort in both periods and private capital
accumulation under the assumption that there is no complementarity
between the two types of-capital for h1 2 (i,g') = 0] are
-.- > d0 - 0, and -1 <di< 0.
dg dg dg
There are two factors playing a role in these results. First, as
usual, the negative wealth effect arising as a result of excessive
public capital accumulation tends to raise work effort and lower
consumption in each period. Second, the impact effect of the in-
creased public investment is to reduce the amount of first-period
resources available for consumption and increase their second-
period availability. In his desire to smooth his time profiles for
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consumption and leisure, the agent partially reacts to this scarcity
by a less than one-to-one reduction in private investment. In other
words, the individual borrows from the future to ease the burden of
the shock in the current period. Note that total investment still
has increased, as is evidenced by the fact that current labor supply
has risen while current consumption has dropped. The fall in
private investment, however, is associated with an increase in the
private rate of return which promotes a reduction in second-period
work effort relative to the first period, and thus an ambiguity in
the response of second-period labor supply arises. Note that if
public and private capital were equally as efficient at the margin
(i.e., h1 = h2 ), so that there was no wealth effect associated with
an increase in public investment, then second-period labor effort
would unambiguously decline.
It is also useful to investigate the effects of a rise in
public investment which is complementary with private investment,
e.g., infrastructure investment. The impact effect of such an
increase in public investment would be to raise the marginal
product of private capital and hence its real return since
ar/g=h 1 2 (ig) > 0. This would tend to promote an intertemporal
reallocation of labor to the current period and an increase in
private investment to take advantage of private capital's higher
marginal - -ductivity.
T onclude this section, the effects of various changes
in government spending are provided in Table 2. As before, it is
particularly important to distinguish between changes which are
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Table 21
SPENDINGCCHANGE 1 2 i_ c
(i) Anticipated increase in (+) (+) (+) (-)
future spending, i.e.,
og2 > 0, AgS = 0.2
(ii) Unanticipated temporary (+) (+) (-) (-)
increase in current spending,
i.e., og > 0, 6g2= 02
(iii) Unanticipated permanent (+) (+) (0)3 -)
change in spending, i.e.,
ogjg = g2
(iv) Increase in public (+) (?), (-)5
investment, i.e., og >0.4
The results obtained in this table are based on the
assumptions that 0 < a'(), f 2 (-<1, and h2 (.) < h(-),
2 Assuming that f 12 (") = 0'
3The initial conditions mentioned in Table 1, footnote 1
have been assumed in deriving this result.
4Assuming that h2(-) = 0.
5This result obtains if h2 (-) h1 &) .
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regarded as temporary versus those which are permanent and also
between those which are anticipated versus unanticipated. Further,
the composition of the change in government spending is crucial to
the various results.
VII. Optimal Taxation
One way to analyze the effects of various fiscal policy
programs entailing both spending and distortional tax changes
would be to simultaneously reference Tables 1 and 2 above so
as to determine the impact of the particular spending cum tax
shift in mind. For example, a temporary increase in current
government expenditure financed totally by future labor-income
taxes can be seen to cause current employment and output to rise
and so on. However, the model remains indeterminate in the
sense that there is no theory of government behavior tying various
ad hoc spending and tax plans together.
The approach taken by Barro (1979), and Lucas and Stokey
(1983) is to assume an exogenous stream of government spending and to
derive the tax structure which minimizes the deadweight loss
associated with income taxation. This approach is taken here
except, as in Kydland and Prescott (1980b) and Kimbrough (1984),
government spending is also allowed to be optimally chosen. Note
that the r del utilized in the present paper is less general than
the mod . 'ont ained in Barr o (1 979) and Luc as and St okey (1 983)
in that :'extends only over two periods. Nevertheless, it is more
general in that it is genuinely dynamic, involving capital
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accumulation. This latter aspect is important since it allows the
private economy to smooth consumption and leisure over time in
response to current or anticipated fiscal shocks and it expands the
tax base to include capital income taxation.
The determination of the government's optimum spending cum
tax program is just a variation on the Ramsey (1927) tax problem.
The government should pick the various tax rates and components of
government expenditure so as to maximize the agent's welfare, as
given by the outcome of the optimization problem posed in (3),
subject to its own budget constraint (13). Formally, the govern-
ment ' s problem is
Xf (2) + @h(-) g2
max W(+) + (1) + -fg-+(hr).I(38)
G (1+r) - g1  (l1+r) 3
with its choice variables being given by the fiscal policy vector
c c 4i iG =( , 2 'eg 1 ,g 1 ', 2 ', 2 'g ) and where # is defined to be the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the government 's budget con-
straint. The first-order conditions--in addition to the budget
constraint (1 3 )--arising from this maximization problem are:
aW NW d'r NW dr d A2 f 1(2) d22  9h1 (-) diN- -- - -O~k + f(1 - -+- -+---
oG. -r dG. car dG.- j dG. (1+r) dG. (1+r) dG.
.3 3 3L 3J 3J j
- -2 g) ~(38+ j) Y= 2,
(l+r) dG
th
where C. is the j component of the vector G and similarly k. is
the jt element of the vector k (f(1), ..1) , f2 *
_1 X2f 2 (2) - 1 Sh -r 12
(1+r) ' (1+r) * (1+r) *
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The above set of first-order conditions are readily
interpretable. To begin with, consider the set of first-order
conditions (39) to (41) describing the government's optimal tax
policy. The left-hand sides of these equations can be simplified,
through the use of the envelope theorem and equations (9) and
(13), to obtain
d A Xf 1(2) d 22 _eh 1(e) d
S 2 1 2 d'
U '(1) [f (1).+..1+r) ..' = -G(-'} (3 8+j) Yj =1 ,2 , 3.
To see intuitively the implications of these equations,
divide both sides of (39)--which is the first-order conditions
governing the choice of -- by minus the term in brackets on the
right-hand side of this equation. The term on the left-hand side
of the resulting equation illustrates the marginal welfare loss per
extra dollar raised via an increase in the first-period tax rate,
X1 . The right-hand side of this new equation, or 0, rqpresents the
marginal cost of an extra dollar raised in revenue through distortional
taxation. Note that one could also perform an analogous operation on
both sides of equations (40) and (41). Then the right-hand sides
of these new versions of (39), (40), and (41) are identical, each
being equal to #. Consequently, an optimal tax policy requires that
the marginal welfare loss per extra (present-value) dollar raised
through each tax instrument be equivalent .
. focus on the first-order conditions (42) to (46) which
determic. ie efficient choice of government spending. The left-
hand sides of these expressions can be once again simplified by
using the envelope theorem in conjunction with equations (9) and
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(13) to get
U'(1) m. = -0-} (38+j) Vj=4,5,...,8
th
where m . 3is the s component of the vector m (a '(1) -1,
a ' - 2 (2) -1 h 2(2) -r
f 2 *11+r * 1+r * j1+rj ) . Again, this set of first-
order conditions can be interpreted intuitively. So as to better
understand these conditions, divide both sides of (42)--the
efficiency condition determining the optimal choice of g1--by
minus the term in brackets on the right-hand side of the expression.
The resulting term on the left of the new equation represents the
marginal net benefit of first-period government spending on con-
sumption services (per net tax dollar spent). Again, the right-hand
side of this equation, or $, shows the marginal welfare cost of an
extra dollar raised in revenue through distortional taxation. An
long as government revenue cannot be raised costlessly, the net
marginal benefit of this'government spending, or the marginal value
of gc over and above its resource cost, should be set greater than
zero. Finally, note that by performing analogous operations on
equations (43) to (46), it can be seen that the net marginal benefit
per (net) tax dollar spent should be equalized across the various
components of government expenditure.
A complete characterization of the government's optimal
income tax program is implicitly given by equations (39) to (46)
which are the efficiency conditions governing the tax policy, (13)
representing the government's budget constraint, and (10), (11),
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and (12) describing the economy's general equilibrium. This is
a system of twelve equations in twelve unknowns, 8, 2 ' ',
g1 , g 2 ' g 2  0 , ' 2, and i. As can be seen, even a basic
understanding of the optimal tax policy in this simple model
requires a detailed knowledge of the interaction between tastes
and technology.1 3  An elementary question one could ask is whether
or not labor income tax rates are likely to be constant through
time. That is, will there be uniform labor-income taxation across
time here? A glance at the system of eleven equations describing
the economy's general equilibrium would seem to indicate that in
general the answer is no.
In order to further focus on this question, suppose that
only labor-income taxation is available to the government and that
the pattern of government expenditure is exogenously imposed on
the economy (i.e., drop equations (42) to (46)] with ge cand
2 £2
g1 = g2 . Next, note that from the first-order condition (7),
private investment, i, can be written as a function of the real
interest rate, r, and government investment in public goods, g1.
Thus, one could write i= i(r,g ). Evaluate this function at
r (1-6)/P and set 65= h(i( ,g1),g 1 ) + 2i(I ,gi) + 2gi. Now
suppose that labor-income tax rates were the same across time and
test whether this provides a solution to the model. If X,= A2'
it can be 'sen that equations (10), (11), and (12) describing the
model's we 'al equilibrium would imply that £1=22 and i=ig g)
Consequen. :y, it follows that c1  c2 , Also, note that (13) implies
that the government must have a balanced budget in each period here,
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so that g1 = 1f(Lg 1) and g2 = X2 f ( 2 ,g2 ). Finally, this
solution also satisfies equations (39) and (40). This follows
df 1 d£A d 22 - d
because in this circumstance + (j7) = + (1+r) ,
while the budget deficit terms vanish. Thus, a sufficient con-
dition to have uniform labor-income taxation across time in the
model is that the real equilibria in the first and second periods
are identical. How departures from this benchmark case will
influence the structure of income taxes is a question which will
be explored in the subsequent section.
Before proceeding further, however, it will be noted that
certain restrictions can be placed on the forms of taste and
technology which will guarantee uniform labor-income taxation
across time in the absence of investment-income taxation. As
is discussed by Razin and Svennson (1983) and Kimbrough (1984),
if preferences are implicitly separable between consumption and
leisure and technologyfs linear, with government spending
being excluded from the functions U(*), f(-) and h(-) , then
labor-income tax rates will be constant across time for arbitrary
values of government spending in each period.14 (See Appendix B
for further discussion.)
Iti this section the analysis of government spending shocks
and optimal taxation is brought together through the use of
numerical simulations. For simplicity, the pattern of government
spending is exogenously imposed on the economy implying that
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equations (42) to (46) will be excluded from the government's
optimal fiscal program. The constants, # and 61, and the
functions U('), V('), f(-), and h(-) are parameterized as
follows: _=.95, s 1:20.13, U -40.2exp(-.025c), V= -exp(I),
f 21 20.091, and h = .5 In(i). The first simulation is conducted
under the constraint that the set of tax instruments available
to the government consists of labor-income tax rates alone while
in the second simulation the rate of return on investment is
allowed to be taxed as well. This setup makes it possible to
direct attention to three questions: 1) What are the effects
of temporary and permanent changes in the level of government
spending on employment, output, investment and the rate of return?
2) To what extent are labor-income taxes smoothed across time?
3) What is the implication for the structure of labor-income taxes
of the addition of an investment tax?
The analysis begins by studying the case of labor-income
taxation solely. Table" reports the results of various experiments
involving pure government spending shocks. Permanent increases in
government spending result in a negative wealth effect which tends
to increase work effort in each period. However, associated with
the higher government spending are permanently higher distortionary
labor-income taxes, which induce a substitution away from market
(employr -, output) to non-market activity (leisure). On net,
the sub it ion effect dominates and employment and output fall
15
in each p.:iod. Further, as the temporal incidence of the
spending/tax burden is even across time there is no incentive for
Table .3
Deficit
Case g1  g2  g 1  f(1}
I. No Government Spending 0 0 0 0 0 1 .8238 1 .8238 9.50 4
II. Temporary Government Spending 5 0 .0709 .0705 2.40 1.8239 1.8108 7.46 4
10 0 .1446 .1427 4.71 1.8213 1.7897 5.63 41
15 0 \.2232 .2184. 6.87 1.8144 1.7563. 4.08 3
III. Anticipated Government Spending 0 5 .0669 .0672 -2.44 1.8137 1.8227 11.67 4
0 10 .1348 .1357 -4.88 1.8008 1.8158 13.93 4
0 15 .2043 .2059 -7.32 1.7835 1.8024 16.25 3
IV. Permanent Government Spending 5 5 .1377 .1377 0.0 1.8080 1.8080 9.5 41
10 10 .2814 .281.4 0.0 1.7694 1 .7694 9.5 3















this burden to be shifted from one period to the other. Thus, output
is reduced by equal amounts in each period and investment and the
rate of return are left unaffected. Finally, in accordance with the
example in the previous section, the government finds it optimal
to equalize labor-income tax rates across both periods of the model.
. Next , consider a temporary rise in current government
spending which involves, in Case II, a strong intertemporal sub-
stitution effect on work effort since the temporal incidence of
the government expenditure in the first period creates an excess
demand for goods and. a rise in the rate of return. In order to
isolate, roughly, the impact of the rise in this relative return to
work effort, compare the second line of Case II with the first
line of Case IV which have approximately the same values for the
-II
permanent leve l of government spending , i.e. , g (1+r)/(2+r) .10
= (1 .089)/(2.089) * 10 = 5.21 e 5 = gW. In response t o the rise in
the relative return to work effort, employment and output rise in
the first period relative to the constant employment and output
path which would have been forthcoming had the temporal incidence
of the government spending been equal across periods.
Further , notice the remarkable tendency for the government
to redistribute the burden of financing the first-period public
expenditure over the two periods by running a deficit nearly equal
to one- ' the size of the expenditure. Tax rates are only
slighth~ 0her in the first than in the second period, with the
greatest difference between tax rates across time being two percent.
The fact that labor is taxed at a (slightly) higher rate in the
first period relative to the second appears to arise because the
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increase in government spending creates a rise in the interest
rate and promotes an intertemporal substitution of work effort
from the second to the first period. Consequently, to minimize
the aggregate area of the sum of welfare loss triangles, the
government taxes relatively more the good with the larger tax
base, which is first-period labor supply.
In sum, the conclusions to be drawn from Table 3 are,
first, that permanent increases in government spending reduce
output while temporary increases in government spending- -relative
to the permanent level--increase output. These simulation
results are in basic agreement with the empirical results contained
in Barro (1981), although in the latter study a tendency for
permane-t increases in public expenditure to raise output was also
found. Second, the assumption of constant income tax rates appears
to be a reasonable approximation to the optimal tax structure. Of
course, the latter conclusion depends crucially on the assumption
that government spending does not interact directly with the marginal
product of labor and thereby cause an asymmetry in labor market
conditions in the two periods. Finally, there exists a positive
correlation between government budget deficits and high interest
rates. However, there is no causal relationship between these two
variables. Rather, it is the extraordinary demand for real
resources in the period in which government spending actually
occurs which is the source of the movements in interest rates
(to eliminate the excess demand) and the deficit (as the government
spreads the tax burden across time).
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Consider now Table 4, where the set of tax instruments has
been expanded to include the investment tax. The first thing to
notice is that there is less of a tendency for labor-income tax
rates to be constant across time. For example, in the case of
permanent government spending the tendency is for the first-period
tax rate to be lowered and the second-period tax rate to be raised
from a position of equality. The reason would appear to be to
lessen the negative impact on inves ment of the introduction of
the investment tax by reducing the current labor-income tax and
raising the future labor-income tax rate, which shifts the
relative burden of labor-income taxation to the future and promotes
capital accumulation. Nevertheless, on net the after-tax real
rate of return falls and the consumption profile has a negative
incline.
This general pattern for tax rates carries through to the
cases of temporary current and anticipated government spending as
well. In both cases thd'introduction of the investment tax tends
to switch the relative burden of labor-income taxation away from
the first period and toward the second period. This, it should be
noted, leads to current temporary government spending having larger
stimulative (or at least less.detrimental) effects on first-period
labor effort and output than in the case where the investment tax
was absent
T d cude, the addition of the investment tax seems to
bias the time profile of labor-income taxation so as to encourage
first relative to second-period labor effort. Nevertheless, it
Table 4
Deficit
Case g g 2 g 1 - 1 ) 1 2 C C2
I. No Government Spending 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.8238 1.8238 9.50 47.3 47.3 .0
II. Temporary Government 5 0 .0696 .0708 .032 2.5 1.8243 1.8112 7.43 44.63 44.8 .0
Spending 10 0 .1426. .1433 .047 4.8 1.8220 1.7903 5.57 41.2 42.4 .C
15 0 .2208 .2191 .054 7.0 1.8153 1.7572 4.01 37.6 40.0 .1
III. Anticipated Government .0 5 .0647 .0674 .065 -2.4 1.8144 1.8234 11.62 45.0 44.5 .C
Spending 0 10 .1288 .1354 .195 -4.7 1.8033 1.8182 13.80 42.5 41.6 .C
0 15 .1918 .2035 .423 -6.9 1.7898 1.8086 16.01 40.1 38.7 .C
IV. Permanent Government 5 5 .1342 .1381 .099 .12 1.8092 1.8092 9.41 42.1 41.9 .C
Spending 10 10 .2732 .2813 .236 .27 1.7735 1.7733 9.29 36.5 36.0 .c














still appears to be a reasonable conclusion that, to a first
approximation, optimal taxation requires a fairly smooth time-path
for labor-income tax rates.
IX. Open Economy Extensions
The above model can be modified to analyze the effects of
taxation and government spending in a "small" open economy. In
a "small" open economy version of the model domestic residents
would be free to borrow and lend on international capital markets.
Suppose that the world real interest rate is r and assume that
the government taxes (subsidizes) the interest rate on foreign lending
(borrowing) at the rate of 6. The domestic after-tax real interest
rate, r, would thus be given by r = (1-0)r . The agent's maximization
problem would again be described by (3).
Now define b1 to be the first-period trade balance. Thus
b f(1),g - c - i - g.
Note that b1 represents the amount of net foreign lending that the
domestic economy performs in the first period. By substituting an
open economy version of the government's budget constraint (13),
which incorporates a modification to reflect the fact that the
government now taxes the earnings on foreign lending, into the
r epr esen* ive agent 's budget con str aint , shown in (3) , a re lat ion-
ship st -" g that trade must balance intertemnporally is obtained:
+ +g 1 +i+( )(c 2 2] 1 (1 ,'E)+(i)(f(2 2 ,4g +h(i,g')+i] (47)
42
The small open economy's general equilibrium can be described
by the first-order conditions (4) to (7) in addition to the economy's
intertemporal budget constraint (47). Specifically, these con-
ditions yield the following three equations which implicitly define
solutions for , 22, and b
-V'(2 1 ) U(f( g +a(g ) - i -b - gI)(1I-6)f1(ti,g1- (48)
..Vl'(22g(f(2g)+a(g )+h(i,g) +i+ (1+r*)b 1 - g2 1)f(2 )(49)
U '(f( +a(g) - i- b - g () = )( 2) ,g )+I+(+r*)b 1-g2) (50)
[with I I(r ,g ), cf. (7)1.
Note that equation (7) implies that private investment, i, is
solely a function of the world real interest rate, r , and the size
of the public capital stock, g . Thus, one could write i= i(r ,g1),
where I is the level of private investment which is undertaken in
the open economy. It is easy to see that the "small" open economy
version of the model closely parallels the closed economy one.
Basically, net foreign lending, b1 , in the open economy reacts the
same way in response to many shocks as investment, i, does in the
closed economy.
To. see this, consider the effect of a temporary increase
in current labor-income taxes on labor effort in each period and
on net ext ernal saving s. By per formiing the r equired compar at ive
statics exercise on (48), (49), and (50), it is easy to show that
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current labor effort, , falls, future labor effort, 22, r.ises,
and net foreign lending, b 1 , decreases. The intuition is clear.
Since a temporary increase in current labor-income taxes creates
a disincentive to work effort in this period, agents will sub-
stitute intertemporally toward working more next period where the
after-tax marginal product of labor is now relatively higher. The
reduction in current work effort will cause a loss in current income.
Current consumption will not drop by the full loss in current income
since agents will smooth out the effects from this loss in income
over both periods. Consequently, individuals will reduce consumption
in the first period by less than the reduction in current income.
This can be achieved by lending less (or borrowing more) on inter-
national capital markets. Thus b1 will fall. Due to the reduction
in net foreign lending that part of second-period income derived from
first-period net foreign savings will be smaller. This, shortfall
in income from net foreign savings will be met by a reduction in
second-period consumption as well as by an increase in second-period
labor effort.
The important point to note here is that a temporary increase
in the current labor-income tax rate causes first-period savings to
decrease in both the closed and open economy versions of the model.
In the closed economy, this causes the interest rate to rise and
investmer- .0o fall, while in the open economy the trade balance
.tends to ng into a deficit . It happens that in many situations
the trade balance deficit of a small open economy responds in the
same f ashion to shocks as the real interest rate does. in a closed
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economy. Since the trade balance is more readily observable than
the real interest rate, it may be more useful to test the open
economy version rather than the closed economy version of the
above model.
There is one important difference, however, between the
closed and open economy versions of the model. In the closed
economy domestic fiscal shocks cause movements in the after-tax
real interest rate which in turn generate intertemporal sub-
stitution effects which affect agents' consumption-leisure decision-
making. In the small open economy this channel of effect is no
longer operational since the domestic after-tax real interest rate
*
is now exogenous, given by r = (1-6)r . Fiscal policy shocks
impact on agents' consumption-leisure decision-making only to the
extent that they are either associated with wealth effects or
with changes in incentives to work or to invest induced by changes
16
in proportional taxation.
To see.this more clearly, consider the case where the
government increases public investment and assume that there is
no complementarity between private and public capital. As analyzed
previously, such a change in fiscal policy exerts two effects on the
closed economy's general equilibrium. First, to the extent that
public capital is less efficient than private capital, a negative
wealth effect is created. This tends to stimulate labor effort and
reduce consumption in both periods. Second, this increased public
investment tends to reduce the economy's resources available for
first-period vis-a-vis second-period consumption and leisure. This
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drives up the real interest rate which works to reduce current
consumption, investment, and future labor supply effort and
stimulate current labor supply effort and future consumption.
In the small open economy this second channel of impact is not
operational. Consequently, consumption falls and labor supply
effort rises in both periods with no effect on private investment.
Note that the economy finances this increased current public invest-
ment by reducing current consumption, increasing current labor
effort, and by borrowing from abroad against its increased future
output--derived from both a higher level of work effort in the
future and an incieased public capital stock. Finally, to the
extent that public and private capital are complements in production,
a greater level of public investment will induce an upward movement
in private investment which is required in order to equilibrate the
return on private investment with the world interest rite. The
agent will finance this new higher level of private investment by
borrowing on world markets and this will tend to further exacerbate
the deterioration in the trade balance.
To conclude this section, the effects in the small open
economy of various shocks in fiscal policy are presented in-Table 5.
X. Conclusion
A r-'ail neoclassical general equilibrium is constructed in
this pa- - to investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy.
The two-jp. -iod model presented probably represents the simplest
choice-theoretic paradigm that can be utilized to address fiscal
policy adequately. Despite its simplicity, the framework employed
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Table 5
L(and y1) 22 I c1
TAX CHANGE
(i) Anticipated increase in future in- (+) (-) (0) (-) (+)
come tax rate, i.e., 4 =0, A 2> 0.
(ii) Unanticipated temporary increase in (-) (+) (0) (-) (-)
current income tax rate, i.e.,
LW >0, =0.
(iii) Unanticipated permanent increase in the (-) (-) (0) (-) (0)
current income tax rate,
%e =A 2 > 0.
(iv) An increase in the tax rate on (-) (+) (0) (+) (-)
investment income, e.
SPENDING CHANGE-
(i) Anticipated increase in future (+) (+) (0) (-) (+)
spending, i.e., gs2Q, sg0.
(ii) Unanticipated temporary increase in 3 (+) (+) (0) (-) (.)
current spending, i.e., _
(iii) Unanticipated permanent change in (+) (+) (0) (-) (0)
spending, i.e., gs=LgS s.
(iv). An'incre se in public investment, (+) (+) (0),() (-) (
Dai > 0.
ISome initial conditions have been assumed
2 2 *
are.: g = g2 , = , 0, and 1/P (1+r ).
in deriving this result. They
It has been assumed that: 0 < a'(.), f2 (-) < 1, and h2( <1 *
3 A suming that f0 2  *
4 22 (}*
In deriving this result it has been assumed that g= g2 , and 1/0 = (1+r*).
5
Assuming that h1 2 (') 0.
6This holds when h12 () >0
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allows economic actors to make a consumption and labor supply
choice in each period and decisions about how much real and
financial capital to carry over between the two periods. It can
also be used to address issues on both the expenditure and taxation
sides of fiscal policy. On the expenditure side of fiscal policy,
government services were modeled as yielding consumption and production
benefits for the private sector while government investment in public
capital augmented society's future production possibilities. On the
taxation side, government revenue could be raised through either
labor-income taxation, corporate income taxation, or bond financing.
A salient feature of the analysis.is that when investigating the impact
of fiscal policy changes, it is important to distinguish whether they
are transitory or permanent in character, and whether they reflect
current but unanticipated events or expected future ones. The frame-
work was also flexible enough to model both the closed and "small"
open economies.
While the simplistic framework used can generate a qualitative
picture about fiscal policy issues, it provides no insight about the
likely quantitative impact of various fiscal programs. Obtaining
quantitative estimates of the effects of alternative fiscal policies
is likely to be an important avenue for future research. One way to
proceed toward this end would be to construct a numerical dynamic
general e~ .- librium model and then simulate the impact of alternative
fiscal p' mas. By judiciously picking functional forms and parameter
values in t .e model, a quantitative estimate of the welfare gains and
losses associated with various government policies could perhaps be
48
obtained. Such a modelling strategy would seem to be in the spirit
of Kydland and Prescott's (1 980a, 1982) work. The model presented
in this paper, hopefully, is a stepping stone toward this goal.
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Appendix A
This appendix is presented to provide the interested reader
with a taste for some of the technical aspects of the comparative
statics results discussed in the text. The results of those
comparative static exercises not discussed here can be easily deduced
by mimicking the line of argument utilized below. To begin with,
the impact of a change in 2on 1'2 and i can be discussed by
taking the total differential of equations (10), (11), and (12). The


























where , (1-), 12 (1-X 2 ), 0 (1-0) and the notation x(t) means
that the arguments in the function x(-) are being evaluated at their
date t values. Define -OCas the determinant of the 3 x 3 matrix on
the left-hand side of the above equation system. The expression for
0Qis
2= [V(1) +U(1) A f (1)
2
+ U(1)X f 1 (1)){ph U (2) [V'/(2) +U(2)X2f1(2)
2
2
+ U'(2)X 2 f 11 (2)l
+ p(1+eh1 )(+hp)U"(2) [V"(2) +U"(2)7 2 f 11(2)]}
- U"(1)[V"(1) +U' (1) 1f11(1) 1 [V"4(2) +U (2)E2f1 (2)2+ U'2) $2f11(2) ]
>0.
Solving the system of equations (A.1) yields
dt 1 = U'(2)f(2)U (1)f (1)A P(1 +eh')U"(2)f'(2)/ > 0 (A.2)
2




2= -U' (2) fl (2) {{V'7(1) +U," (1) f7 (1) 21+ U' (1) f (1)l 0 [3h U' (2)
2
+ P(1 +8h 1 )(1+h)U"(2)] + [v"(1) +U"(1)X f 1 (1) ]U"(1) }/C2<0 (A.4)
Consequently, it follows from (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) that the
derivatives presented in the text in (14) have the signs shown.
Also, through the use of (A.2) and (A.3) it can be seen that
2 2
(A .5)
where the term in this expression is unambiguously positive.
Using (A.5) together with (15) in the text it immediately follows that
dc1 /dX 2 < 0, as was stated.-
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Next, some of the results in Section V will be derived. To
begin with, how is c2 related to 62 in the economy without government
intervention? From (21) it can be seen that
di -f (2)U(2).-z = 2U < 0 (A .6)
d 52 [V"(2) + f1 (2)U' (2) + f1(2)"2U(2) l
By using the above result (A.6) in conjunction with (9) it follows
immediately that
dc 2  V"(2)+ f11(2)U' (2) .
d52  (V'(2) +f 11 (2)U'(2) +f 1 (2)Zu"(2)]
In an entirely similar fashion the response of first-period labor
supply and consumption to an increase in investment for either the
economy with or without intervention can be deduced from (20) or
(26), and (8) to be
dl f1 (1)Up(1)
di [V"(1) +f 11 (1)U'(1) +f 1 (1)U (1) ]
and
d c -{V'(1) + f (1)U'(1)]
di (V"(1) +f (1)U' (1) +f 1 (1)23 (1)]2
Finally by taking the total differential of equations (10), (11)
and (12) the impact that a temporary increase in government spending on
services has on 12' £2 and i can easily be uncovered. It is easy to
see that when doing this exercise the 3 x3 matrix on the left-hand side
of (A.1?) remains the same and all that changes is the 3 x1 displacement
vector on the right-hand side of this equation. The results obtained
are:
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dL1 =-(1.-a'(1)A ' (1- )f2(1)]U a(1) Itf I(V)'h U' (2) 2
d g 1+s( ) 1 ( ) I f ( P 2 1  l 1  L V)[ V f 2) + U L( ) f + ( 2 ) } f 2 )> 4 A 7




ags [1-a'(1)p.(1-p)f 2 (1)]U'(1)f(V"(1) +U'(1)f 11 (1)U[V"(2) +U"1(2)f 1 (2) 
2
d1
(2) f 11 (2) 1310 < Oil (A.9)
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Appendix B
In this appendix the implications for uniform labor income
taxation of a preference structure which is implicitly separable
between consumption and leisure and linear technology are examined.
To begin with, 'assume that labor income taxation is the only tax
instrument available to the government. Then, as mentioned in the
text, if preferences are characterized by implicit separability
between consumption and leisure, and production is linear, with the
functions U(-), f(-), and h(-) being independent of government
spending, then uniform labor income taxation will obtain. This is
easy to show. Let f(t )=Wt (actually for the argument being
employed the marginal product of labor, w, can be different across
time) and h(i) =hi. From the agent's optimization problem (3)
it can be seen that his period-t labor supply, It, is given by the
compensated labor supply function t t'(1,w 2,DwD,U) where wtP yt t 1 2 -
(1t)wt and D = 1/(1+h). In this situation, 
the first-order
conditions (39) and (40) governing the optimal determination of X
and X2 can be rewritten as
X, w 2 2 + X Dw w It =(g/U'(c 1 ))(w2 1 -w 2 1 - X Dw w I ] (B"i)1 w 4 ,2 2 1 2 2,2 = [w 1  1 1,2 2 1 2 2,2
1s22s_ WwXs DhW2Lsw Dw D w2 L (/'(c) 225 2221 1 2 ,3 2 2 2 , 'c22 1 1 2,3 222,3
(B.2)
with 2s being defined as the derivative of iswith respect to its
t,j t
jt argument. The two first-order conditions (B.1) and (B.2) can be
manipulated to obtain the following formula
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/ (1- ) EDQ2. 1 , 3 /L 1 D 2 2 , 3 l
2 2 L1~ 2 2/' 2  1 21 , 2 /. 1 ]
[note that s £S by symmetry of the Slutsky matrix)
1,3 2,2
Now, implicit separability between.consumption and leisure implies that
,4 1s1 _ 2, 1 / 2 and Is/Ot1=L2, 4s/ 2 which together with the standard
"adding up" condition from consumer theory, or that 4s +W t,2+
Dw 's +Ds = 0, it follows that the numerator and denominator of
2 t,3 t,4
the right-hand side of the above expression are equal. Consequently,
labor income taxation is uniform across time. Note implicit separability
between consumption and leisure implies that the sum of the proportional
effects of a change in first-period after-tax real wage rate on first-
and second-period labor supply exactly equals the sum of the proportional
effects of the second-period after-tax real wage rates on these labor
supplies.
In the intersection between strongly separable preferences
assumed in the text and the implicitly separable preferences assumed
here lies the logarithmic utility function. The first simulation under-
taken in the text was rerun with logarithmic preferences: U(c )=
1 2
- Inc and V(L) =- in(L-L) with J= 6.53. It was hoped that this
3 3
- simulation would highlight the implications for uniform labor income
taxation across time of variability in the real interest rate, since
when h(-) =hlni the economy can only trans form resources across time
with dimi- 'ng returns. The results of this (perhaps more
controlles. unulation were quite similar to those reported for the
first-one with there again being a remarkable tendency to smooth tax
rates across time. (It should be noted that no serious -attempt was made
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in any simulation to choose parameter values, or a' functional form
for h(-), etc., which would maximize the variability in the tax rates




Helpful comments from Robert Barro, V. V. Chari, Peter Howitt
and Michael Parkin are gratefully acknowledged.
'Note that it is being assumed that the world "starts up" at
the beginning of period one. Consequently, in the first period the
agent does not have either any physical capital or bonds which he has
brought over from the past. Since there is only physical capital in
the second period there is no need to index i (or g ) with a subscript.
Also, it trivially follows that first-period private investment equals
the second-period capital stock. Alternatively if one liked, b could
be viewed as capturing the effects of capital investment undertaken
prior to period one. Value added from this period-zero capital
investment is not taxed.
2 The agent's intertemporal budget constraint can be derived by
eliminating his holdings of bonds, b, from his first- and second-
period budget constraints: c + i+ b = 6S+ (1-X 1 )f( 1 ,g )+T 1 and
-~I
c2 2  2)f ' 2)+i+(1-)h(i,g )+(1+r)b+'
3 The arguments of the function W() are: X , 8, -'2 T1,2'C) 1' 2' 1 2
cc .t £ -i
g1, g2 , g1 , g2 ' g and r.
- 4
An alternative, and perhaps more intuitive, representation
of the model's general equilibrium describing the system of demand
and supply nctions implicit in (8) to (12) is given by the
following r equations
2 (wt~~ £(,iI 2 ,D,U) (with wt t t)w and D 1/(1+r)) Yt=1,2
58
. (1,W ,N2 c12,U) + iD; i)g+g1 = s1 + f(Id(-),g1)
c i i
(with gt t+gt +gt ~ 9t-1)
and
E(1,w ,Dw2 ,D,gg92'-)+ i()+g +Dg 2 .1+ f(21(*),g )+D[f(A (-),g ) +
, h d i) + d '+es Q - 2
where w and wt are the before- and after-tax period-t real wages, D
t t
is the after-tax market discount factor, and E() is the expenditure
function associated with the problem minc1+ Dc
2 - wi'i- Dw 212 gc,g2,U.
[Note that the endogenous variables here are w1 , w 2 , D and U.] Greenwood
and Kimbrough (1984) use a framework similar to this to analyze the
international transmission of fiscal policy shocks in a two-country
world--with and without capital controls.
5This can easily be seen by noting that the system of equations
(10), (11) and (12) describing the model's general equilibrium does
not involve any transfer payment terms. For a full discussion of the
theorem see Barro (1974) and Chan (1983).
6One could also view 6 as a tax on private savings. To see
this, suppose that the government taxes both the real return on bonds,
r, and the value-added from capital h(i,g ) at the rate B. Now
denote r = (1-8)r. Solving the agent's optimization problem in this
circumstance leads to almost the identical set of first-order
conditions as those shown above; equations (5) and (6) remain the
same, whereas now r replaces r in (4), (7), and the agent's budget
constraint. Note that the representative agent's choices are
implicitly described by his first-order conditions (4), (5), (6),
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and his budget constraint, with (7) being eliminated by substituting
it into both (4) and the budget constraint. However, this system
of equations is identical in both circumstances.
7
All the results reported in Table 1 can be readily obtained
by following the standard comparative static procedure outlined in
Appendix A.
As has already been demonstrated, the timing of distortional
taxes has important implications for the macro economy. To combine
the effects of a government spending scheme with a distortional tax
financing policy would be to run the risk of confounding the effects
of government spending with income -taxation. Also, there would be
many distortional tax schemes capable of financing a given change
in the present-value of government spending and it would be hard to
know how to choose among them.
9 Note that the definition for a temporary change in government
spending employed here is different from that of Barro (1981). Barro's
definition holds, at the original interest rate, constant at the
present value of government spending. That is, in the two-period
setting adopted here he would fix the value of g +(1/(1+r))g2. This
would imply, at the initial interest rate, that an increase in
current government spending, g , must be offset by a reduction in
1
future gove -ment spending, g2 . The analogous exercise in the current
model wouA , 'e to reduce second-period government expenditure, g2 ,
by an amou which would keep the representative agent's level of
utility, U, constant. Barro deletes the wealth effects from a
temporary increase in current government spending so a-s to emphasize
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the scarcity of private disposable resources in the current period
vis-a-vis the future that results. This tends to drive up the real
interest rate and consequently increase current labor supply and
output. The definition employed here incorporates the negative
effect that a temporary increase in government spending will have on
agents' wealth. Presumably, temporary government spending, such as
for wars, could have significant adverse effects on agents' wealth
positions. This negative wealth effect would tend to increase labor
supply effort and output in the first and second periods.
1 0 it may seem reasonable to conjecture that the effect on
capital accumulation will depend upon whether the time profiles of
consumption and leisure are positively or negatively inclined through
time. FL r instance, one may speculate that if (1+r) > P so that the
time profiles of.consumption and leisure are upward sloping, ceteris
paribus, then the bulk on the burden of the shock will be absorbed in
the fu-ture. The original conjecture, however, turns out to be false.
It seems that how the burden of the shock is distributed through time
depends upon the time profiles of the marginal propensities to
consume goods and leisure (see Greenwood and Kimbrough (1984)). These
marginal propensities to consume in general may be either increasing
or decreasing functions of the real interest rate.
1 Persson and Svensson (1984) also discuss optimal taxation
policy and provide an intuitive explanation of the time inconsistency
problem associated with it.
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1 2Note from Section III describing the economy's general
equilibrium that 2 and 22 in (38) are implicit functions of Xi, X2 '
cL2 i c C LIg2i
e, gg, g2 ' g2 and g , i.e., Lt t l' 2' ' 1'2'l 2,g) Yt=1,2,.
13Note that the derivatives contained in (39) to (46) are
themselves dependent upon taste and technology, as can be verified
by glancing at the solutions for (14) contained in Appendix A.
14ml ctsprbltImplicit separability is a form of separability imposed on
the consumer's expenditure function. In the case under study it
would imply that the agent's expenditure function, E(),--c.f. footnote
4--can be written in the following form: E(1,5 ,D~2 ,D,U) = E(c(1,D,U),
(w ,D2,U),U)where c(1,DU) and 2(w ,D 2 ,Uj) are group price indices
for consumption and leisure, respectively,over which the macro
expenditure function E(-) is defined.
1 5 The maximum level of permanent government expenditure that the
model economy could sustain was 18.8. That there is such a maximum
follows from the Laffer curve effect. Note that as the level of
permanent government expenditure is increased so does the labor income
tax rate, and this induces a drop in labor supply. At high enough
tax rates the gain in revenue resulting from higher tax rates is out.
weighed by the fall in revenue caused by the cut in labor effort.
1 6 - - - -- -Fiscal shocks emanating from within a large open economy can
obviously - -ct the world real interest rate. For an analysis of
the intern .nal transmission of fiscal policy in a two-country
world, where such an effect is operated, see Frenkel and Razin (1984)
and Greenwood and Kimbrough (1984).
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17 The first of these facts is easily deduced from the form of the
implicitly separable expenditure function given in footnote 14.
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